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I. INTRODUCTION

Teaching hospitals face unprecedented challenges that necessitate
changes to how America finances the residency requirements of physicians’
education and training. Predicted physician shortages,1 new health care
*
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See Graduate Medical Education: Training Tomorrow’s Physician Workforce,
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL COLLEGES (AAMC), https://www.aamc.org/download
/386374/data/07252014.pdf (predicting the nation will be short 130,600 physicians by 2025).
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payment reforms,2 and demands for greater price transparency3 all highlight
the need for revisions to current graduate medical education financing
structures.
For years, hospitals have delivered hands-on training experiences for
physicians and an array of other caregivers during their journey from
students to fully licensed practitioners.4 Teaching hospitals incur substantial
costs to provide these residency or clinical experiences and have relied on a
complex and fragmented financing structure to balance those costs. 5 This
multi-faceted, indirect and complex cost recovery system worked marginally
well while teaching hospitals were paid predominantly on a fee-for-service
basis for the patient care they provided, and when individual customers had
little incentive to compare providers based on costs. Those conditions,
however, are eroding quickly.
After summarizing existing financing systems underlying physician
residency programs, this article explains the mounting pressures that
jeopardize the sustainability of physician residency programs as payment
reforms and price transparency initiatives move forward. To ensure ongoing,
high quality physician training programs, we propose employing new
mechanisms for ensuring that teaching hospitals can be competitive under
new payment reforms without diminishing their commitment to medical
education.
II. BACKGROUND
How society finances graduate medical education, especially for
physicians, is a rising public policy concern as multiple and sometimes
conflicting demands collide in the arena of public debate. It is important to
recognize a few underlying realities of educating and training physicians that
confine the options available to solve the policy challenges which are
discussed later in this article.
First, before entering the health care workforce as fully licensed
practitioners, physicians need practical, hands-on, and supervised training,
commonly referred to as a residency.6
2
See, e.g., Fact Sheets: Better Care. Smarter Spending. Healthier People:
Paying Providers for Value, Not Volume, CRS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.(Jan. 26,
2015), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheetsitems/2015-01-26-3.html.
3
See, e.g., Russ Mitchell, Employers, Unions Jointly Demand Health Care Price
Transparency, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 1, 2012), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/
employers-unions-jointly-demand-health-care-price-transparency/.
4
See Graduate Medical Education, supra note 1.
5
See id. (estimating teaching hospitals’ direct costs of medical education
programs to be $16.2 billion each year).
6
See Catherine Dower, Health Policy Brief: Graduate Medical Education,
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1 (Aug. 16, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs
/healthpolicybrief_73.pdf. After medical school, physicians complete their training as
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Second, while a physician completes his/her residency, the teaching
institution, which is most typically a hospital, incurs direct and indirect
expenses and inefficiencies.7
Third, during their residency and hands-on training, physicians
perform services for patients and, in so doing, constitute a “key part of the
labor supply at these hospitals.”8 However, “[t]hese residents do not, overall,
generate revenue” for a teaching hospital.
Given these underlying realities, the net result is that teaching
hospitals bear financial costs that other “non-teaching” hospitals do not
shoulder. The policy issue at hand, therefore, is how society should finance
those additional costs incurred by teaching hospitals in order to maintain
their residency programs.
The current approach commonly used by Medicare and some states’
Medicaid programs—often teaching hospitals’ two most significant and
influential payers—is an attempt to upwardly adjust their traditional fee-forservice payment amounts for services provided to their enrollees to recognize
and partially mitigate these hospitals’ education and training costs. These
public payers make supplemental payments up to and above the standard
rates for hospital services when those services are delivered to a Medicare or
Medicaid beneficiary by a teaching hospital.
In other words, if a non-teaching hospital’s Medicare payment for a
particular service was $X, then a teaching hospital’s Medicare payment for
the same service would be $X + (supplemental payment $Y). Thus, two
hospitals in the same community may receive different payment amounts
from the same public program for the same service if one hospital is a
teaching hospital and the other is not.
In an attempt to recognize two different categories of costs teaching
hospitals incur, Medicare makes two different supplemental payments to
teaching hospitals.
A teaching hospital’s direct costs, such as spending on physician
faculty members’ and residents’ salaries and benefits, a portion of a teaching
hospital’s overhead, and the administrative staff needed to manage the
programs, are referred to as direct graduate medical education (direct GME
or DGME).9 Congress enacted a GME supplemental payment in an attempt
to recognize and pay for some of these costs in amendments to the Social
Security Act through the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(COBRA) of 1985.10 This statute, along with its corresponding regulations,11
residents. This training usually occurs in hospitals over the course of four years, or longer for
highly specialized fields. Id.
7
See, e.g., THE LEWIN GROUP, An Assessment of Hospital Medicaid and
Medicare Payments in Minnesota, at slides 15–16, 18 (Mar. 2004).
8
Id.
9
See What does Medicare have to do with Graduate Medical Education?,
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES 1, https://www.aamc.org/download/253380/
data/medicare-gme.pdf.
10
See Pub. L. 99-272 § 9202 (1985) amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2015).
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establish a complex methodology for determining each teaching hospital’s
base period per-resident cost amount (PRA) by dividing the hospital’s
allowable operating costs in its base year by the number of residents in
training at the hospital during that base year.12 For most hospitals, federal
fiscal year 1984 serves as their base year.13
Medicare uses this PRA ratio from the base year and multiplies it
with the number of full-time-equivalent residencies provided by a teaching
hospital in a given year, and then applies that amount to Medicare’s
proportional number of inpatients served by the hospital.14 The formula used
by Medicare takes into account several variables including but not limited to
the unique needs of psychiatric hospitals.15
The GME program and methodology for calculating supplemental
payments to teaching hospitals are not designed or intended to cover all of
those hospital’s expenses resulting from training and educating physicians.
According to the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), the
average direct graduate medical education costs incurred by a teaching
hospital for training a single physician resident amount to approximately
$100,000 per year.16 Medicare’s direct graduate medical education
supplemental payments for the average teaching hospital, however, account
for only $25,000 of the hospital’s estimated $100,000 of costs.17
Since enactment of COBRA, the GME program has been impacted
by other major pieces of federal legislation. Most significantly, the Medicare
Modernization Act of 1996 imposed a cap on the number of physician
residencies teaching hospitals could count when calculating the amount of
GME supplemental payments Medicare pays.18 Consequently, many teaching
hospitals that train more physicians than the number allowed to be counted
for determining GME payments have artificial limits on the amount of
supplemental funding from Medicare to support their education and training
programs. These caps remain in place and unchanged since 1996.
11

42 C.F.R. § 413.75–83 (2015).
See Direct Graduate Medical Education (DGME), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/Acute
InpatientPPS/dgme.html.
13
Id.
14
See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww
(2015).
15
See id. § 1395ww(a)(2)(B).
16
Id. See also Joanne Conroy, The Graduate Medical Education Debate,
HEALTHAFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 22, 2012, 4:11 PM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/02/22/thegraduate-medical-education-debate/ (estimating training cost per physician at $75,000 to
$100,000).
17
See Colin P. West, Quality of Life, Burnout, Educational Debt, and Medical
Knowledge among Internal Medicine Residents, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS. 9 952, 952 (2011); see
also Joanne Conroy, The Graduate Medical Education Debate, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb.
22, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/02/22/the-graduate-medical-education-debate/
(estimating training cost per physician at $75,000 to $100,000).
18
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(4)(B)(vi)(I).
12
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Although the total number of GME-supported residencies remains
unchanged, the Affordable Care Act authorized Medicare to reallocate some
of the residencies. If a hospital had not used all of its available GMEsupported residencies slots for the past three years, Medicare could reallocate
65% of those slots to other hospitals.19 As a result, 726 GME-supported
residency slots were shifted from 267 hospitals to 58 other hospitals.
The Affordable Care Act also authorized Medicare to redistribute
GME-supported residency slots from any hospital that closed, including slots
from hospitals that closed on or after March 23, 2008.20
The teaching hospitals eligible to receive additional residency slots
through this redistribution had to be located in a state in the lowest quartile
of states based on the number of residents-to-population, or in rural or health
professional shortage areas, and no single teaching hospital could receive
more than 75 reallocated residencies.21
In addition to direct GME costs, teaching hospitals shoulder indirect
costs that accompany hosting a physician residency program (indirect GME
or IME) costs.22 Because teaching hospitals need to recruit and retain the
faculty, facilities and expertise necessary to train tomorrow’s workforce, they
attract patients with more acute and complex conditions, offer a wider array
of medical services and typically engage in research related activities.23 As a
result, teaching hospitals’ operational costs are higher than those incurred by
similar organizations without teaching programs.24
Attempts to document and measure these indirect costs, however,
have not produced consensus regarding the financial consequences of IME.
According to one study, a teaching hospital’s average cost per Medicare
patient was as much as 28% higher than a nonteaching hospital’s.25 Another
study estimated that IME costs could cause a teaching hospital’s costs to be
19

Id.§ 1395ww.
Id. § 1395ww(h)(4)(H).
21
As calculated by Medicare, only hospitals in the following states could meet
these eligibility criteria: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Puerto
Rico, South Dakota, Wyoming. See, Redistribution of Graduate Medicare Slots, AM. COLL. OF
PHYSICIANS (2013), http://www.acponline.org/advocacy/where_we_stand/assets/iii4-redistri
bution-graduate-medica-education-slots.pdf.
22
Despite the language centered on “medical education,” IME payments are more
directly related to case and service mix costs that are associated with medical education
programs than to the expenses of the actual medical education activities. See Report to the
Congress: Aligning Incentives in Medicare, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N (June
2010), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/Jun10_EntireReport.pdf?sfvrsn=0. See also
Catherine Dower, Health Policy Brief: Graduate Medical Education, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG
(Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=73
(hereinafter MPAC Report).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
See Lane Koenig, et al., Estimating the Mission-Related Costs of Teaching
Hospitals, 22 HEALTH AFF., 6 112, 113 (2003).
20
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almost 40% higher than a general hospital.26 While the Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has dismissed such estimates as
significantly inflated and distorted.27
Despite the lack of consensus on the amount of IME expenses
teaching hospitals carry, there is agreement that hospital operational costs are
higher if the hospital offers physician residency training. To offset a portion
of these indirect and nebulous costs, Congress amended the Social Security
Act to authorize Medicare to make IME supplemental payments on top of the
standard reimbursement rates for services teaching hospitals provide to
Medicare beneficiaries.28 Only teaching hospitals that are eligible to receive
GME payments are eligible to receive IME payments.29 These IME
payments cover an estimated 2.7% of hospitals’ indirect medical education
costs.30
As with GME, the methodology for calculating a teaching hospital’s
IME payment is complex.31 Instead of using a hospital’s cost-to-resident
ratio, as in the case of GME, IME payments begin with a calculation of the
teaching hospital’s number of physician residents compared to the number of
its inpatient beds. This ratio is then multiplied by a factor set by Congress.32
In short, a teaching hospital’s IME payments reflect the number of residents
it trains relative to the size of its inpatient hospital operations.
Congress has changed the IME payment factor many times over the
years.33 Although Medicare’s GME and IME supplemental payments do not

26

See A. Dobson, et al., Financial Performance of Academic Health Center
Hospitals, 1994–2000, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Sept. 2002), http://www.
commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/fund-report/2002/sep/financialperformance-of-academic-health-center-hospitals--19942000/dobson_financialperformance_543-pdf.pdf (estimating that academic health centers’
average costs were 27–39% higher than other organizations).
27
See MPAC Report, supra note 22 (arguing that teaching hospitals’ IME
expenses are grossly exaggerated).
28
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 USC § 1395ww(d)(5)(B)
(2015).
29
See id.
30
See Koenig, supra note 25, at 113; see also Dower, supra note 7, at 2. But see
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ALIGNING INCENTIVES
IN MEDICARE (June 2010) (arguing that Medicare’s $6.5 billion in IME supplemental
payments to teaching hospitals actually exceed those hospitals’ IME expenses by $3.5 billion).
31
See generally, 42 C.F.R. § 412.105.
32
See id.
33
See, e.g., Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub.L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (decreasing IME factor from 7.7% to 5.5%
over four years); see also Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act
of 1999, Pub.L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.; see also Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of
2000 (BIPA), Pub.L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) (delaying reductions to ad revising short-term factors for IME payment methodology).

2015]

DETANGLING GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION

317

cover the costs of teaching hospitals’ medical education programs, Medicare
is the single largest financier of medical education in the United States.34
In addition to Medicare’s supplemental payments methodologies,
many states’ Medicaid programs have adopted payment formulas designed to
provide increased funding to teaching hospitals.35 By supporting graduate
medical education through their Medicaid payment mechanisms, states are
able to leverage federal matching funds.36 Therefore, between states’
spending through Medicaid and the accompanying federal matching funds,
Medicaid is the second largest payer of graduate medical education costs
nationwide.37
Unlike the Medicare program, the federal Medicaid program
contains surprisingly few restrictions or requirements on whether or how
states support medical education through supplemental Medicaid payments.38
Any such payments or support through a state’s Medicaid program to
teaching hospitals must be contained in an approved state plan amendment.
Although there are different approaches to the manner in which state
Medicaid programs approach graduate medical education funding, some
states follow Medicare’s approach and provide support for both direct and
indirect medical education.39 For those states, as well as most that follow
other formulas or definitions, the typical mechanism used to convey medical
education funding in Medicaid programs is through their fee-for-service
methodologies.40 Thus, like Medicare, most Medicaid programs’ graduate
medical education financing comes in the form of supplemental payments or
increased fee-for-service reimbursement rates for services provided to
Medicaid enrollees.
If, however, a state relies on managed care organizations (MCOs) to
administer coverage for Medicaid enrollees, the state’s capitation rates to the
MCOs must be adjusted to account for any medical education payments that
34

See Dower, supra note 6, at 1.
See Tim M. Henderson, Direct and Indirect Graduate Medical Education
Payments: A 50-State Survey, ASS. OF AM. MED. C.’S 3 (Apr. 2010), https://members.aamc.
org/eweb/upload/Medicaid%20Direct_Indirect%20GME%20Payments%20Survey%202010.
pdf (documenting 41 states and the District of Columbia (DC) financially supporting graduate
medical education in 2009). It should be noted, however, that the number of states investing in
graduate medical education has dropped from 47 in 2005, and nine other states considered
proposals to drop such investments in 2009. Id. at 3. It is also important to note that state
Medicaid payments for medical education are in addition to any financial support states
provide to medical schools through direct appropriations. See id. at 2 (noting that states spend
$5 billion in appropriations for medical training outside of Medicaid payments).
36
See id. at 2, n.7.
37
See id.
38
See Tim M. Henderson, Medicaid Graduate Medical Education Payments: A
50 State Survey, ASS. OF AM. MED. C.’S 5 (2013) http://dhhs.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/dhhs.
nv.gov/content/About/GMETF/2014/2014-05-14_Item12a_Medicaid_GME_2013_Report_
AAMC.pdf.
39
See id. (documenting five states that pay for both direct and indirect graduate
medical education).
40
See id 2, 4 (documenting 40 states and Washington D.C.).
35

318

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:311

the MCOs are required to pay. Any capitation rate adjustments to MCOs for
medical education must be made after the state first establishes actuarially
sound capitation rates.41
The federal government’s combined spending on graduate medical
education through Medicare and states’ Medicaid programs amounted to
$9.5 billion in 2010.42 Of that total amount, $3 billion was in the form of
direct GME supplemental payments and $6.5 billion went for IME
supplemental payments.43 Since then, the 2015 federal budget cut $960
million from GME funding44
Because Medicare and Medicaid patients rarely incur different outof-pocket costs based on whether they receive care at a teaching hospital or a
general hospital, individual patients generally do not face particular
incentives or consequences due to the fact that their hospital receives or does
not receive supplemental medical education payments for the services the
patients receive. As a result, these patients covered through public health
programs have little incentive to make their care decisions based on the
overall payment amount the hospital will receive. In such a payment
environment, neither hospital is at a competitive disadvantage with respect to
attracting patients insured through these public programs.
Although less intentional and measurable, commercial payers, such
as health plans and self-insured employers, often have financial implications
based on whether their enrollees receive care from a teaching hospital.45
Because none of the public sector’s supplemental payment streams fully
cover teaching hospitals’ actual costs of providing medical education and
training experiences, to remain financially viable teaching hospitals must
resort to negotiating higher reimbursement rates from commercial health
plans and third party administrators. This practice, commonly referred to as
cost shifting, essentially transfers and spreads a portion of the teaching
hospital’s medical education costs to the privately insured market.
For teaching hospitals trying to cobble together sufficient revenues
to support their residency programs, this multi-faceted, indirect and complex
medical education cost recovery system worked marginally well. However,
in order for it to work without putting the teaching hospitals and their higher
cost structures at a competitive disadvantage, several key elements need to
be in place: (1) Public and private health plans pay for hospital services on a
fee-for-service (FFS) basis; (2) Individual patients are shielded from
incurring any out-of-pocket cost implications from receiving care from a
41

See 42 C.F.R. § 438.6(c)(5)(v).
See Dower, supra note 6, at 2.
43
Id. at 2.
44
See Michael Sandler, Teaching Hospitals’ Residency Levels Growing Slowly,
MODERN HEALTHCARE (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150202
/NEWS/150139994.
45
Stuart Guterman, Financing Teaching Hospital Missions: A Context, HEALTH
AFFAIRS (Mar. 2015), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/22/6/123.full.
42
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teaching or non-teaching hospital so their decision is not influenced by the
overall cost structure differences between teaching and non-teaching
hospitals; and (3) Hospitals in competitive markets have little or no
information about what other hospitals were paid for particular services.
Each of these circumstances necessary for the current medical
education financing system’s functionality are becoming obsolete. New
health care payment methodologies and cost transparency initiatives are
explicitly designed to compare and differentiate between hospitals based on
how much they cost—or, more accurately, how much revenue they receive—
to treat patients. Under these new payment methodologies, whether they are
bundled payments, total-cost-of-care shared savings arrangements, global
payments, or capitation, hospitals that deliver patient care at lower costs (or
for lower reimbursement) will receive benefits or advantages in a
competitive market, and those that require higher revenues to deliver the
same services or level of care will face negative financial incentives and/or
find themselves as a competitive disadvantage.
Therefore, in these new payment methodologies, teaching hospitals’
supplemental payments and higher negotiated commercial rates jeopardize
their ability to remain competitive when they are compared to other
hospitals. Teaching hospitals’ opportunities for earning shared savings
bonuses under accountable care organization (ACO) or total-cost-of-care
(TCOC) models are more limited. While both teaching and non-teaching
hospitals strive to reduce supply chain costs, decrease their patients’
utilization of health care services and find greater efficiencies in their care
delivery operations, teaching hospitals continue to carry the medical
education portion of their overall costs and that portion is difficult to reduce
without cutting the number of physicians being trained or eliminating the
hospital’s residency program entirely.
Similarly, as more individuals in the privately insured market obtain
health coverage that features a high deductible, individuals have greater
interest in the variation between hospital reimbursement rates. If one hospital
has negotiated a higher reimbursement rate for a particular service from the
individual’s health plan, to the extent that the individual will bear all or part
of that higher cost through his/her deductible, there is a real and tangible
incentive to select a hospital that negotiated a lower reimbursement rate.
Again, to the extent that teaching hospitals negotiate higher payment rates
from commercial health plans to help offset a portion of their medical
education expenses, they become less attractive to people with high
deductible health plans.
Another outcome correlated with the increasing prevalence of high
deductible health plans, is the growing efforts to make health care providers’
“prices,” or estimated costs of care, more transparent and publicly available.
One driving force of these initiatives is giving individuals with high
deductible plans more information with which to compare providers,
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including hospitals, based on price so they may make health care decisions
that align with their financial interests.
Although price transparency efforts have not yet received significant
use by individuals, they are gaining attention from self-insured employers,
health plans, the media and other providers who are interested in learning
about variations in health care reimbursement rates. Therefore, while price
transparency initiatives may evolve into tools used to influence individual
patients’ decisions, they also carry the potential to increase pricing
competition among providers and hospitals and their private sector payers.
Again, teaching hospitals face a competitive disadvantage to the extent that
these transparency activities highlight the differences in reimbursement rates
due to teaching hospitals’ need to finance medical education and residency
programs.
Another health care reform impacting teaching hospitals is the rise of
health plans that offer narrow networks of providers that are considered “in
network” for purposes of calculating the insured’s coverage and benefits. To
attract individual consumers shopping for coverage and comparing premium
costs through health insurance exchanges and in response to increased
pressure from employers looking to hold down their portion of premiums
while continuing to provide health benefits for their employees, health
insurers are designing and marketing insurance products with narrow
networks of providers. Recognizing the premium price sensitivity in today’s
market, health plan companies seek to carve out higher cost hospitals and
clinics from their networks, thereby enabling them to create strong financial
incentives for their enrollees to receive care only from lower cost in-network
providers.
Insureds who receive care from an out-of-network hospital,
therefore, often face substantially higher out-of-pocket costs. In this way,
narrow network health plans intensify cost-sensitive decision-making that is
similar to and compounds the incentives individuals face under high
deductible health plans. Because of their need for higher negotiated rates to
help offset their graduate medical education program costs, teaching
hospitals are more susceptible to being carved out from narrow network
health plans.
Under these new payment methodologies, lights of transparency, and
insurance plan designs, teaching hospitals will find themselves at an
increasingly competitive disadvantage. Higher cost structures due to their
residency and clinical training programs, supplemental payments
incorporated into their care delivery reimbursements, and higher negotiated
reimbursement rates with commercial payers leave teaching hospitals less
competitive on total-cost-of-care measures and appearing to be more
expensive compared to other hospitals, and more vulnerable to narrownetwork plan designs.
Without medical education financing reform, teaching hospitals may
face difficult choices between retaining their residency programs, which help
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ensure that the health care system as a whole has trained physicians capable
of delivering high quality care to an aging and increasingly diverse
population, but becoming less competitive with other hospitals and facing the
financial consequences that follow, or reducing or eliminating their residency
programs in order to bring their cost structures more in line with their
competitors.
The complexity of the current financing system and misguided
proposals already under discussion add to the difficulty of implementing the
needed reforms.
III. POTENTIAL BUT MISGUIDED AVENUES
Today’s policy debate on the topic of graduate medical education
tends to center on two simplified and conflicting views. Essentially, these
views start from placing priority on one of two values: the need to meet the
projected demand for physicians to care for individuals or the need to cut
government spending. Entering the discussion from either of these two
objectives has not led to proposals for practical, needed reforms to the
medical education financing system.
On one hand, some policymakers point to predicted physician and
health care workforce shortages and the increasing burdensome student debt
carried by new physicians to support their calls for expanding public support
of medical education. Based on these predictions of shortages and the
financial strains already imposed on newly licensed physicians, these
policymakers advocate for proposals such as increasing public financial
support of scholarships, medical schools, GME or IME, loan forgiveness
grants, etc. These proposed policy mechanisms are designed to address or
mitigate particular financial challenges associated with medical education
and training costs, and to create new or increased financial incentives to
encourage the following stakeholders to make the following decisions:
(1) College graduates to enter and complete medical school;
(2) Medical schools and hospitals to offer educational and
training opportunities necessary for those medical students to
complete their education and training necessary to meet
accreditation
and
licensing
criteria,
and;
(3) Hospitals and clinics to recruit, hire and retain new
physicians, especially those who agree to provide care in
underserved communities, such as rural areas, or in
particular specialties perceived to have a shortage of medical
professionals, such as in the areas of primary care or
psychiatry.
Proponents of these recommendations are able to enter these ideas
into the policy debate because each of these recommendations has merit from
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a health care workforce development perspective. However, they do not offer
changes to the financial distribution methodology that are necessary for
teaching hospitals to provide residency programs and compete on cost
measures with non-teaching hospitals simultaneously.
Also, proposed incentives for college graduates to attend medical
school and for new physicians to practice in certain geographic areas or
specialties in return for loan forgiveness fail to address how to fund the
teaching hospitals’ residency programs that medical students will one day
need before any of them are available to help fill gaps in access to care.
Instead, the only aspect of this set of “increased funding” proposals
designed to support physician residency programs is a straightforward
increase in funding, presumably through the existing supplemental payment
methodology that leaves teaching hospitals vulnerable to the downside
consequences of payment reforms and transparency initiatives.
On the other hand, state and federal budget deficits and increased
concern over the rate of health care cost growth lead some policymakers to
target the government’s spending on graduate medical education for cuts.
The total amount of federal spending on GME—almost $10 billion—
combined with MedPAC’s claims that estimates of teaching hospitals’
medical education costs are overstate, have been used to support proposals to
reduce support for GME payments.46
In addition to MedPAC itself, the National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform47 recommended cutting federal GME and IME
spending by $6 billion.48 Under this proposal, direct GME spending would
be capped at 120% of the average resident’s salary with future adjustments
tied to the rate of inflation.49 The Commission relied on MedPAC’s
characterization of medical education costs to suggest reducing IME funding
to reflect actual costs more accurately.50
President Obama’s proposed budgets have suggested cuts to IME
funding. Although he did not embrace capping direct GME payments as
proposed by the Commission, he has proposed cutting GME funding for
children’s hospitals by 50%, and his most recent budget proposal includes
$16.3 billion of IME cuts over ten years.51
46
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND
REVENUE OPTIONS 43 (2011), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/03-10-reducingthed
eficit.pdf.
47
Also referred to as the Simpson-Bowles Commission.
48
See NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, THE MOMENT OF
TRUTH 38, (Dec. 2010), https://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files
/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See Bob Herman, Obama’s 2016 Budget Cuts Medicare but Eliminates
Sequestration, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Feb. 2, 2015) http://www.modernhealthcare.com/
article/20150202/NEWS/302029967/obamas-2016-budget-cuts-medicare-but-eliminatessequestration.
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These proposals are politically palatable on both sides of the partisan
aisle because they promise to decrease health care related expenditures
without directly cutting patient care or individual providers’ income. Calls to
hold graduate medical education at current levels or impose cuts seem more
likely to be implemented than proposals to increase funding.
At the same time, the policymakers proposing cuts to graduate
medical education spending are not suggesting that medical schools or
teaching hospitals reduce the number of physicians being educated and
trained.52
Thus, assuming there is general political consensus that the number
of physicians needed to provide sufficient access to care is expected to
remain equal to or greater than current levels, and assuming the amount of
public financial support for graduate medical education will remain static or
decrease, on whom will the costs of medical education fall?
There are three predictable proposals for how the costs of residencies
should be financed after cutting government spending on graduate medical
education, each of which has shortcomings.
A. Require Teaching Hospitals to Absorb the Costs
The direct and indirect costs of residency programs are too high for
teaching hospitals to simply “absorb” or self-finance. Instead, asking
hospitals to absorb these costs is more accurately described as asking
teaching hospitals to increase the rates they charge to private payers for the
care patients receive.
As discussed earlier, hospital payment reforms and increased
transparency will make it difficult for teaching hospitals to recoup medical
education costs by charging higher rates to individuals and health plans.
Instead, under this approach, the pressure on teaching hospitals to
reduce or eliminate their residency programs will intensify, especially if
federal GME or IME funding is cut in the amounts being discussed in
Washington, D.C.
B. Require the Physician Residents to Finance the Residency Portion of
Their Training through Their Tuition or Direct Payments to the Teaching
Hospital
Intuitively, many people jump to the following analysis: Physicians
fall into high income brackets, therefore; Physicians have sufficient
resources to repay medical education debt, therefore; Medical students
should borrow to fund the cost of their education and then repay those loans
during the high-income years that lie ahead.

52

See Dower, supra note 6 at 2.
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While initially attractive in its simplicity, this analysis is not
consistent with the practical realities faced by today’s medical students and
practicing physicians. Physician residents already shoulder significant
financial burdens as they enter graduate school from their previous
education. Medical education debt is an increasing burden for tomorrow’s
physicians. Moreover, the policy and patient care implications of medical
debt, extend beyond the individual doctor’s financial realities of student
loans.
A recent study in the Journal of the American Medical Association
found that medical residents carrying higher debt loads experienced higher
rates of burnout.53 More concerning, however, is that the study showed that
residents’ medical knowledge appeared to suffer when their education debt
was more than $200,000.54 And, as one might expect, residents with both
high education debt and emotional exhaustion performed even more poorly
on medical knowledge tests.55 Although the study was inconclusive, its
authors were troubled by the correlation of higher educational debt with
emotional exhaustion and poorer performance on tests of medical knowledge
during one’s residency.56
Therefore, policy proposals that rely upon simply shifting residency
and teach hospitals’ associated costs to the physician resident can be
expected to generate several undermining consequences:
(1) Discouraging some individuals from pursuing medical
careers because of concerns about the subsequent debt
obligations;
(2) Prohibiting some of those who do complete their
education and training from entering certain types of
practice, such as primary care, or from practicing in certain
areas of the country, such as rural communities, due to their
need for higher incomes;
(3) Reducing the resiliency and length of career of
physicians with higher debt loads and earlier burn out;
and/or
(4) Potentially diminishing the quality and safety of care
patients receive from those physicians stressed by financial
debt and the corresponding emotional burnout.
53

See West, supra note 17, at 952; see also id. at 954 (noting that quality of life
and satisfaction with work-life balance suffered with higher education debt amounts); see also
id. at. 955 (noting that emotional exhaustion and depersonalization increased with higher
education debt amounts).
54
See id. at 955 (stating that residents’ performance on the Internal Medicine InTraining Examination decreased by a statistically significant amount for those reporting debt
exceeding $200,000).
55
See id. at 959.
56
See id. at 958.
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C. Require Medical Schools to Pay Teaching Hospitals for Providing
Residency Training to Their Students
Under this approach, it is reasonable to expect that medical schools
would need to simply transfer this additional expense to students through
higher tuition charges. Consequently, this approach suffers from the same
hazards as the philosophy that expects physicians to borrow or self-finance
their own residencies.
IV. PROPOSED PATH FORWARD
Under new health care payment reforms that use measures of
efficiency or costs of care to vary hospitals’ reimbursement amounts,
supplemental GME and IME payments create significant problems for the
long-term viability of residency and clinical programs.
Even without addressing the different functions of the care delivery
payment system and building a medical education financing structure that is
separate from calculations of providers’ costs of care, it is clear that teaching
hospitals will face increasing financial and market pressures to reduce or
even eliminate their training programs. At a time when many commentators
predict substantial shortages in caregivers, especially primary care
physicians, restricting the number of training and residency slots available
runs counter to the goal of meeting communities’ health care workforce
needs.
Furthermore, supplemental payment structures misalign incentives
because a teaching hospital’s total medical education payments will fluctuate
based on the number of Medicare or Medicaid patients it serves. This is
particularly true for most state Medicaid programs because the federal
government will not match state spending unless it is based on the volume of
services teaching hospitals provide to Medicaid beneficiaries, not on other
bases more closely aligned with graduate medical education, such as per
resident allocation.57 As a result, teaching hospitals that serve populations
with large numbers of Medicare or Medicaid enrollees may receive
significant supplemental payments even though they may not have
correspondingly large training or residency programs, and vice versa for
teaching hospitals with large training programs in communities with
proportionately smaller populations of public program enrollees.
One potential risk to developing a new payment system is that it
could make medical education funding more politically vulnerable to being
cut. Today, such cuts are difficult for elected officials to support because
imposing the cut essentially reduces Medicare or Medicaid payments, which

57

See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(b) (2015).
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seem threatening to voters worried about losing access to care or covered
benefits.
Therefore, any new financing systems need to be joined to policies
or safeguards that establish long-term sustainability and predictability so
teaching hospitals can appropriately plan ahead and make reliable
commitments to the residents, nurses, pharmacists, and other professionals
who agree to train in their facilities.
A foundational objective for graduate medical education finance
reform should be to detangle payments to reimburse providers for care
delivered to patients from payments for educating and training the physicians
and caregivers of the future. So long as GME payments to teaching hospitals
are interwoven with payments to teaching hospitals for care delivery, it will
be difficult for teaching hospitals to compete under new payment
methodologies and consequences of price transparency activities.
By detangling support for medical education activities from
reimbursement for care delivery, it will be easier for payers—both public and
private—to compare the performance of hospitals on more equal terms.
Teaching hospitals would need to be able to deliver patient care for the same
or lower costs than their competitors or suffer the market’s consequences.
At the same time, because the financing of their residency programs
would not depend on the kinds or volume of services they provide to
particular patient populations, or face elimination because of a hospital’s
need to reduce the appearance of having high-cost care delivery, teaching
hospitals could have greater confidence in the sustainability of their
residency programs.
In order for such parallel financing systems to work, there will need
to be a method for identifying and distinguishing which portion of a payment
to a hospital is for patient care and which portion, if any, is for graduate
medical education.
State and federal regulatory restrictions should be adopted to
preclude Medicare, Medicaid or any other public program, as well as
commercial health plans, self-insured employers or other entities, such as
those seeking greater price transparency, from including the GME portion of
a hospital’s revenue in any calculation of the hospital’s total-cost-of-care,
efficiency or other formula intended to compare or evaluate hospitals based
on their care delivery. In other words, once the distinction between revenue
from care delivery and revenue from medical education programs is clear, no
one should be allowed to re-tangle the two for purposes of comparing one
hospital’s cost of care to another’s.
Of course, the current GME system does not offer the kind of
precision in cost accounting necessary for establishing how much the public
or private payers should pay to support teaching hospitals’ education and
training programs. Therefore, a multi-stakeholder task force comprising
representatives of teaching hospitals, public and private payers, and
independent third party auditors, should attempt to track and calculate as-
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close-to-actual costs of GME programs as possible. Although no
methodology or calculation will perfectly account for every variation
between residency programs, establishing a more objective baseline will
enable policymakers to adequately adjust existing expenditures to align with
teaching hospitals’ costs.
Once such a cost accounting methodology exists, there will no
longer be a need for Medicare or Medicaid programs to distinguish between
direct GME and IME payments, so these can collapsed together. Doing so
will reduce administrative complexity while enhancing the kind of
transparency need to clearly distinguish between payments for care and
payments for education. Likewise, because a more precise measure of actual
costs of GME activities will be available, the financing system should shift to
calculating GME payments based on the number of residents trained, perhaps
with adjustments to create incentives for increasing the number of physicians
who will practice in shortage areas, rather than the number of Medicare or
Medicaid beneficiaries treated.
As noted earlier, once these payments are distinguishable from one
another, it might be politically expedient for elected officials to cut spending
on graduate medical education because they could point to their efforts to
protect payments for care delivery from cuts. Not only does the threat of
funding cuts jeopardize the financial sustainability of residency programs,
the prospect of GME support becoming a fluctuating bobber rising and
falling with year-to-year or election-to-election political or budgetary waves
would erode teaching hospitals’ confidence in their financial wherewithal to
extend what are often three- to seven-year commitments to physicians
looking for residencies.
Therefore, while detangling GME payments from care payments is
necessary to allow teaching hospitals to survive under new payment
methodologies and transparent environments, the GME payments should
continue to flow through Medicare and Medicaid programs in a manner that
prevents legislators or regulators from cutting GME without simultaneously
cutting reimbursement rates for care delivery.
Finally, policymakers will need to decide what portion of GME costs
should be borne by privately insured populations. Because Medicare and
Medicaid are funded through broad-based taxes. If GME programs were
supported exclusively through these public programs the GME programs
would arguably be supported by everyone. On the other hand, given
estimates of current Medicare and Medicaid spending relative to teaching
hospitals’ costs for residency programs, it seems unlikely that increasing
those public programs’ expenditures to the levels necessary to fully finance
GME will be practical.
Instead, Congress should consider a “covered life assessment” that
would be paid by commercial health plans, third party administrators of selfinsured employers’ plans, and Medicare Advantage and Medicaid-managed
care organizations. The revenues from this assessment would be dedicated to

328

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:311

Medicare and used exclusively for the GME portion of teaching hospitals’
Medicare payments. Although such an assessment would face significant
political pushback from business groups, advocates opposed to tax increases
or government programs, and health plans, such a tax would better reflect the
reality that everyone who accesses the health care system benefits from the
medical education and training their caregivers received at the outset of their
careers.
V. CONCLUSION
If left unchanged, current financing systems supporting teaching
hospitals’ physician residency programs will begin to work against the
teaching hospitals’ sustainability. Teaching hospitals struggle to compete
against non-teaching hospitals with lower cost structures under new payment
reforms, increased transparency, and the natural economically motivated
decisions that accompany the increasing reliance on high deductible health
plans and narrow provider networks. Teaching hospitals will be forced to
decide between fulfilling their mission-driven commitment to educating and
training the workforce of tomorrow at the risk of financial ruin or
abandoning their residency programs to cut costs that allow them to compete
head-to-head with hospitals unburdened by those costs. This impossible
choice can and should be avoided.
By detangling GME payments from reimbursements for care
delivery, new payment models, price transparency initiatives, and health plan
design innovations will progress in a fashion that evaluates hospitals solely
on the costs of care delivery without confusing such analysis with costs
associated with supporting GME programs.
For such detangling to work for payers, teaching hospitals,
policymakers and consumers, there must be guardrails that establish greater
long-term certainty of financial support for GME programs, continued use of
Medicare and Medicaid programs as the backbones for allocating GME
support preferably on a per resident basis, and the implementation of a
national covered lives assessment or similar broad based surcharge on
commercial insurers, third party administrators and managed care
organizations in public programs to ensure that GME programs are supported
by all of those who benefit from the physicians and caregivers they train.

